Pushing Putin for a ceasefire: Dmytro Kuleba on Ukraine's future and Russia's goals
Listen: What will it take to end Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? President Trump is pushing hard for a ceasefire deal, but is Vladimir Putin actually interested in negotiation? On the GZERO World Podcast, Ian Bremmer is joined by former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba for a sober assessment of the war with Russia—and what it will take to end it. Kuleba resigned last year amid a cabinet shuffle, but spent years at the heart of Ukraine’s diplomatic fight for survival. As long as Russia believes it can win the war, he says, Putin will never compromise on a meaningful ceasefire deal. That won’t change until the Kremlin faces serious pressure from the White House, which so far has seemed to only offer incentives to Moscow, while punishing Kyiv, according to Kuleba. So is Trump ready to get tough on Putin? And what is Ukraine prepared to offer Russia in return to bring the fighting to an end? Bremmer and Kuleba discuss Putin’s goals in the war, the Trump administration's negotiation strategy, and what it will take to finally bring peace to Ukraine.
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Transcript: Pushing Putin for a ceasefire: Dmytro Kuleba on Ukraine's future and Russia's goals
Ian Bremmer:
Hello and welcome to the GZERO World Podcast. This is where you'll find extended versions of my interviews on public television. I'm Ian Bremmer. And today, what will it take to get a ceasefire in Ukraine? It's a question that we have asked on this podcast, but it's always been hypothetical, not anymore. President Trump has made it clear he wants to ceasefire badly, and he will do what it takes, he says, to get one. He didn't end the war in 24 hours as promised on the campaign trail, but his administration has been directly engaging with Russia diplomatically. And that's not a bad thing. Wars end at the negotiating table, not the battlefield. The problem is that the Kremlin has so far shown no interest in compromise. Instead, it's been slow-walking negotiations, increasing demands for concessions and testing the patience of the friendliest White House that they have faced in years.
So what will it take for Trump to start piling pressure on Putin? And even if Moscow does make a deal, can Kyiv trust them to honor it. To help make sense of the stakes and what happens next, I'm joined by former Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Dmytro Kuleba. Kuleba spent years helping secure foreign military aid and keeping Western allies committed to Ukraine's survival as this country was being invaded, until resigning last September amid a cabinet shuffle. We talk about Putin's real goals during negotiations, President Trump's strategy to get a deal done quickly, and what happens next for our country still fighting for its existence. Let's get to it. Dmytro Kuleba, great to have you on the show.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Thank you.
Ian Bremmer:
It's been three plus years of fighting. Should we have moved more quickly towards a ceasefire negotiation?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Well, there are a lot of ifs and coulds in this conversation, but to be completely honest, knowing the situation from the inside and how it evolved, I don't think we are... We neither were we close to a ceasefire or we are close to a ceasefire, because this war will continue to rage as long as Russia and Ukraine will continue to believe that they are capable of winning it, which is still the case.
Ian Bremmer:
Looking back, what's the biggest thing, if you could have been on the US side of these conversations that you had, what's the thing that you wish the Biden administration had been able to do that they didn't?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Providing us Ukraine with everything that we needed to continue the successful counter offensive operation in the autumn and winter of 2022. That was the critical moment. You'll ask me about the ceasefire. We were not close to a ceasefire back then, but that was the moment when Ukraine liberated half of its territory that had been previously occupied and returned to the city of Kherson, the only regional center that had been occupied by Russia in the early days of invasion. That was the moment when Ukraine was in the strongest position possible and Russia could not pull itself together. Its army was literally rolling backwards.
Yes, we were exhausted as well, I do not undermine that factor, but if we had had more weapons and all kinds of support to continue with this counter offensive, we would have liberated vast parts of our territory. But as we've heard from some sources and even media publications, Russia realizing its dire condition, it seemingly had threatened to the use of nuclear weapons to stabilize the situation. And this allegedly had put Biden administration in a difficult position. Now, I don't want to judge them. I totally understand the risks at stake, and this is why I'm referring to allegedly and seemingly, but that was the period when a lot much more could have been achieved.
Ian Bremmer:
So we're in a different environment right now. The front lines apparently have stabilized. I mean, Kursk, the Ukrainians have had to pull back after that surprise attack. The Russians haven't taken significantly greater territory though in Ukraine over the past months and months. Given all of that, why do you think the Russians believe they can still win this war?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Because they believe that the west falters, the United States will walk away, the European Union will not be able to seriously step up its assistance, and Ukraine will continue to deteriorate or to vanish as a result of internal kind of destabilization steered by the Russians from the outside. So this is more or less the calculation that President Putin has.
Ian Bremmer:
Has Trump made it significantly easier for Putin to believe that?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Well, yes, to believe but not to trust. I think this is the element that many commentators miss definitely sees Trump as opportunity, but he does not trust him. This narrows the corridor for his decision making. Why? Because he has the experience of President Trump's first tenure in office when he was willing to reset relations with Russia, as much by the way as President Obama was willing to do it. And although-
Ian Bremmer:
"I'll have more flexibility once the elections are over." Yeah, I see.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Exactly, two gentlemen may not go well along with each other, I mean, Mr. Trump and Mr. Obama. But what brings them together is actually the obsessive idea of a reset with Russia. And it didn't work in 2008, nor will it work now, but Putin remembers that as hard as Trump tried during his first presidency, he still failed and he ended up selling weapons to Ukraine and imposing sanctions on Russian Nord Stream two project. So trust needs to be built, and if they succeed in doing that, of course Ukraine, will find itself in a far more complicated circumstances.
Ian Bremmer:
So of course I want to look at both the Trump-Putin relationship and the Trump-Zelensky relationship and take them in turn. When Trump called Putin a 90-minute meeting, and this is fairly early on in the administration, the Europeans clearly no advanced coordination with Trump on that, the Ukrainians no advanced coordination on that. What was your immediate response as you got the download on the reality of that call as well as the nature of the discussion? How did you respond to it?
Dmytro Kuleba:
That's exactly what I expected to happen, but I did not expect all of this to evolve at such a high speed. I thought my assumption was that Trump would have been trying to do this things at a slower pace. But then I realized that he feels the pressure of time, and this is probably one of the lessons that he took away from his first presidency, that you shouldn't waste a single day in pursuing your goals. Too fast, to some extent, embarrassing, clearly, especially with no result in sight after two months of efforts. Yeah. But I wasn't particularly agitated with the call itself. It was clear that the United States would reestablish the line with Putin, but I never had any expectations about the outcomes of these talks. And I will continue to take the risk of saying that there may be thousands of calls, meetings, and comments, but the deliverables will be miserable. And why? Because Putin is not interested in ending the war. And it seems that Trump and his associates have begun to realize it, that Putin is not going to deliver on the war in Ukraine. But what he's trying to do in his strategy, and I want everyone to understand, he will be feeding Trump with concessions on issues unrelated to Ukraine in order to buy time for himself.
Ian Bremmer:
What are those concessions?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Well, the first thing he did is the release of a US prisoner. Well, the first question, why did you-
Ian Bremmer:
But that was an exchange. I mean, there had been exchanges before in the Biden Administration too.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Exactly. But somehow this particular prisoner was released and which allowed during the first days of Trump administration, which allowed President Trump to welcome him in the Oval Office and to send a clear message that you see, it works. Of course, Putin gets these things. Now, if you listen to him, he's saying, "We can do a lot of things in the Middle East. We can do a lot of things together with President Trump on the North Pole and everything around it," but he never mentions Ukraine. Ukraine for him is something that he wants Trump to let him finish the job, but not to negotiate anything serious. And this is why we don't have a full ceasefire that President Trump had proposed months ago. This is why drones and missiles continue to hit Ukrainian cities and even energy ceasefire, which was so proudly and loudly for 30 days announced and celebrated fails because the Ukraine's energy facilities are still being hit, at a lower scale, but we are in the springtime, so-
Ian Bremmer:
So it doesn't matter as much, frankly.
Dmytro Kuleba:
It doesn't matter that much.
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Now-
Ian Bremmer:
President Trump, though, has made clear that he wants a ceasefire, not a ceasefire for a day or two, but a full end to the fighting. He's promised that all the way through his campaign, and he's promised that since. And he has increasingly shown some signs of frustration that President Putin is not moving in that direction. Now, given that there is a lot on offer from the United States, given that you could be talking about a full rapprochement between the two countries, and given that Trump is also talking about increasing sanctions against Russia, including on their energy export, which the US hasn't touched, which would hurt the China relationship, the India relationship, and they could find other places to buy oil, for example. Do you think that when push comes to shove that Putin is prepared to give that kind of a concession?
Dmytro Kuleba:
No. A long answer to the question depends on how do we answer another question. And that question is this: did Putin come to Ukraine to take a part of it or a whole of it? If you believe that Putin came to Ukraine after a land corridor to Crimea legitimizing the annexation of Crimea and a neutral non-NATO status of Ukraine, then there is ground for negotiations. And then there is a way to kind of find a deal, a deal that will not make anyone happy. But this is usually what good deal is about. But if you answer this question with an affirmative that Putin came after whole of Ukraine because it is so important to him to get it under his control, then there is no ground to negotiate. Then he will be buying time, he will be making some minor concessions in order to buy time. And he will try to take Trump to the point when Trump will agree that Putin takes Ukraine, and in return he does something else big.
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah, but I can answer that question because, of course, the United States isn't Russia, it's not China. Trump is not president for life. I mean, the Russians need to improve their economy, they need to rebuild their military capabilities as well. Giving Trump a ceasefire on Ukraine for the Trump administration as the Russians rebuild their relationship with the United States and the Europeans aren't part of it for a year, for two years, even for four years, why wouldn't Putin consider a deal like that? When after Trump is gone, he can just go right back in.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Because he does not entirely trust the United States. Listen to what he said following the conversation with the latest conversation with President Trump, he said, okay, I will agree to a ceasefire if the west stops sending weapons to Ukraine, if Ukraine stops mobilizing soldiers, making the ceasefire practically impossible, I mean, impossible under these conditions because the goal of this approach of this demand is to weaken Ukraine. Well, he will continue with mobilization. He recently announced a conscription of 160,000 men to his army and rebuilding or ramping up his defense industry. His intention is clear, I don't know, you have to be blind or deaf not to see that he is choosing war over peace, and everything he does is flattering and playing the concessions.
Ian Bremmer:
So if you are right, if that's correct, and your analysis of Putin is that he is not going to come to a deal with Trump no matter what, then the right takeaway for the Ukrainian president is to give the Americans everything they want right now, because you just need to make sure that Putin has the opportunity to fail, right? So in other words, Zelensky should be saying yes to this critical minerals deal, even though it's incredibly negative for the Ukrainians. Because what you need to do is force Putin to be seen as a failure. Why hasn't Zelensky done that?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Putin will agree to a ceasefire if he feels pressed. Russia makes concessions only in two cases. First, when it's weak, and second, when it is substantially meaningfully pressed. Putin does not believe that he's weak. And second, Trump is not exerting any pressure on Putin. Even the latest announcement of global tariffs across-
Ian Bremmer:
Didn't include Russia. That's right.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Didn't include Russia.
Ian Bremmer:
Right.
Dmytro Kuleba:
And I heard the comment-
Ian Bremmer:
And they said it was because there's no trade, which is not true.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Which is a lie. There is trade.
Ian Bremmer:
That's right.
Dmytro Kuleba:
It's not as big, it's just a couple of billions compared to other countries, but-
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah, but 10% of that is a few hundred million dollars. That's right.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Exactly. But that's some money, and you cannot exempt and Belarus as well. You cannot exempt Russia and Belarus, two allies directly involved in the war against Ukraine. So Putin feels, sees that Trump does not want to put pressure on him. So why should he agree?
Ian Bremmer:
But even with pressure, you're saying that Putin, because he doesn't trust the Americans and because he wants to take all of Ukraine, he's not going to do a deal.
Dmytro Kuleba:
If he feels some meaningful pressure on himself and he realizes that he's cornered, then he may agree to a ceasefire, but only then to follow your logic, which is to resume war after conditions change.
Ian Bremmer:
So in other words, the point is he may actually be willing to accept that if the conditions were driven by the US, by the Europeans perhaps together. So given the fact that that's not likely to happen, you don't expect that. I go back to the question I just asked you, which is, doesn't that mean the logic is that Zelensky should be willing to do everything possible to ensure that he's aligned with the US right now?
Dmytro Kuleba:
I believe he should. The problem he's facing is that he does not hear any specific commitment coming from the United States on what Ukraine will get in response.
Ian Bremmer:
I get it, but does he even need one if the entire point is just to make sure that the US-Russia rapprochement does not happen? If you're Zelensky, that is the entire purpose.
Dmytro Kuleba:
That must be his strategy. Yes his strategy should be focused on slowing down or disrupting the rapprochement between the United States and Russia. There are three major ways how to do it. The first one is to please Trump and make him feel happy. The problem with it is that Zelensky asks Trump a simple question, "Okay, I'm going to sign the agreement, the minerals deal, what do I get from you in return?" And Trump taps him on his shoulder and says, "Everything will be fine. Trust me." This is not sufficiently reassuring, right?
Ian Bremmer:
Of course it's not like there's anything that's going to come out of Ukraine in terms of critical minerals anytime soon anyway. So I mean, if I had been advising Zelensky there, and again, you were in the position, the position, I would just be saying, "You know what? It's all noise. Just give it to him."
Dmytro Kuleba:
Well, actually the first draft was an excellent way forward, and it should have been signed. The only problem, there are two red lines about the minerals. The first one, it'll be a grave mistake to recognize grants given to Ukraine by the United States in 2022, 2024 as a loan. And second, it'll be a grave mistake to accept that this minerals deal will cover not only unexplored minerals-
Ian Bremmer:
But already exploited. Yeah.
Dmytro Kuleba:
... but all the resources Ukraine has. If Ukraine agrees to that, that is worse than any colonial... I mean, the United States rebelled against Britain because of the tax, right? Now, the United States are trying to impose, to take all the wealth of the country. What kind of reaction would you expect from the people you are handling this way? But this is the first wave. Still, keep finding ways to please Trump. Second, of course, keep the front line. As long as the front line holds, Ukraine is in a strong position. This is why today Ukraine's infantry man defines Ukraine's foreign policy standing without realizing that.
But as long as he keeps the trench under his control, Ukraine has a strong position. If front line begins to collapse, Ukraine's position immediately drowns. And the third one, of course, keep waking the Europeans up, which is a never ending story, but you still have to do it. There is a secret force option, which is China, but daring to play this game and reaching out to the Chinese and suggesting to open a back channel to counterbalance the current state of affairs is a risky business.
Ian Bremmer:
Now, Trump has also spoken of the Chinese a few times publicly and privately that they can help, they can engage. And yet the Chinese, they haven't bitten on that. They haven't expressed much interest. The Saudis instead came in. It turns out they're the ones that are actually engaging. Tell me the positives and negatives for getting the Chinese involved instead, from your perspective.
Dmytro Kuleba:
China is the only country who can-
Ian Bremmer:
Pressure Russia.
Dmytro Kuleba:
... who has leverage on Russia.
Ian Bremmer:
Right.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Yeah, that's the one and the only argument. China will join the process when it comes to the conclusion that it will be either the one who fixes the problem or, on par, with the one who fixes the problem. China cannot be an assistant of assistance. China cannot play a secondary role. It's either Trump and Xi are the two great leaders who ended the war, or Trump failed and Xi ended the war, but this is not Trump ended the war and Xi helped him. This is not how it works for China.
Ian Bremmer:
So what's the Ukrainian potential back channel? If it were to happen, what would it look like?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Well, I'm a free man now.
Ian Bremmer:
That's why I'm asking you, because you couldn't answer that when you were foreign minister.
Dmytro Kuleba:
I wouldn't be able to answer it, but I think that time for opening a back channel to talk with the Russians through China has right. Because you see, today, Ukraine has dramatically changed its position. It does not reject the very idea of talking to the Russians. It just seeks a format, a convenient format to build this communication. And so, of course, having a direct meeting is out of the question. But in principle, Trump speaks to Putin, then he speaks to Zelensky, and then Trump's officials speak to the Russians, and then they speak with Ukrainian officials. So in principle, like a very indirect line of communication exists, which was not the case, which had not been the case-
Ian Bremmer:
Three months ago?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Three months ago, yes. So if in principle we now agree that certain contacts with Russia through someone else are possible, then perhaps. And we see that Trump does not really have a strong leverage on Putin as Xi has, then why not talking to Xi?
Ian Bremmer:
And Ukrainian relations with China through these last three years have actually been fairly stable?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Well, indeed. It took a price, yes, but we managed to maintain this relationship in shape as good as it could be under these circumstances. We have questions to China, of course, but we also maintained a respectful dialogue with them.
Ian Bremmer:
So I haven't yet asked you about the meeting, right? And of course it's easy to talk about now because it was a disaster, but we ended up in a better position in relatively short order when President Zelensky went to the Oval Office. And of course this is all, the whole meeting is streaming live. So you were able to see it after it played out. What's going through your mind as you're watching it?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Exactly the same word as the one that you used, it was a disaster. It was things running out of control. Three strong politicians, three men with very strong political egos clashed in a room.
Ian Bremmer:
You mean Zelensky, Trump, and Vance?
Dmytro Kuleba:
And Vance, of course. Yes. And this should not have happened. In fact, what we saw in Jeddah 12 days after was exactly what should have happened in the Oval Office. And I tend to believe that things just spiraled out of control there in the Oval Office, not because it was pre-planned to ambush Zelensky and to kind of destroy everything. But because this meeting-
Ian Bremmer:
No, because if it had been, it wouldn't have gotten fixed afterwards, right? Clearly.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Exactly. And there is a minor diplomatic detail, which probably does not speak anything meaningful to an outside viewer, but Trump wanted the minerals deal. We all agree on that.
Ian Bremmer:
Yes. And Vance made it very clear when he went to Kyiv beforehand, like, "You need to do this."
Dmytro Kuleba:
"You need to sign it." Yes. And the deal was ready to be signed. So if Trump and Vance had planned to ambush Zelensky and to expel him from the White House, they would have put the signing ceremony ahead of the actual meeting. So Zelensky arrives the document, the agreement is signed, Trump celebrates, and then he demonstrates to the whole world and his electorate how strong he's by berating Zelensky and expelling him or whatever happened from the White House. But the signing was scheduled to be held after the conversation. So just the protocol issue, but helps you to understand it to that it, in my view, it wasn't pre-planned. Anyway, it doesn't matter anymore. What matters is that this meeting started as a foreign policy meeting and ended up as domestic policy meeting.
Ian Bremmer:
Domestic policy meeting. Yeah.
Dmytro Kuleba:
And the turning point was not the JD Vance attack on Zelensky, but Trump's interruption, interference when he countered Zelensky's words that something bad will happen if you ignore the situation.
Ian Bremmer:
Including to your country, that your country won't be safe, "Mr. president, your country won't be safe."
Dmytro Kuleba:
Exactly. Because Trump came to power, to office with a promise that no bad thing is going to happen as long as he's on duty, and the people of America should be happy. And then he hears that something bad is going to happen to America. Of course, it's not a foreign policy issue, it's a domestic. He was appealing to his voters, not to President Zelensky, while addressing him. And Zelensky, of course, felt that he has to place strong men because the whole world and Ukrainians were watching him, and he made the right bet because his public approval-
Ian Bremmer:
Went up quite a bit.
Dmytro Kuleba:
So in the end, surprisingly, after millions of people survived the heart attack watching this video, but for Trump and Zelensky, in the eyes of their electorates, things went well.
Ian Bremmer:
Yeah. And their relationship is no worse today, really, than it was before that meeting.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Yeah, absolutely. One of the key rules of diplomacy, get your partner right. Know what you can and what you cannot do with him. Know what you can say and what you shouldn't be saying to him. And I believe that that was the episode that none of us deserved, but in the end, it helped Zelensky to better understand Trump, and it also helped Trump to better understand Zelensky.
Ian Bremmer:
Looking ahead, is it reasonable to say the Ukrainians now understand, except that there is no way to return to the 2014 territorial borders?
Dmytro Kuleba:
No. You see, Ukrainians are realists. They totally get where we currently are, but none is ready to abandon the idea that we can change these circumstances eventually at a certain point. So, a nation that a abandons, its dream, its ambition, its goal is doomed to lose. So in a nutshell, Ukrainians today would be ready to accept a deal that would somehow leave the issue of the territory in a gray zone, but they will not be able, and they will punish anyone who will sign, who will dare to agree to anything that gives this territory legally a way to Russia. This is where we are, this is where we will continue to be.
Ian Bremmer:
And there are many former Soviet spaces that have persisted in gray zones for a very long period of time.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Not only that, I mean... People love to draw analogies, and some compare Ukraine with North Korea and South Korea, others with Western Germany and Eastern Germany. But there are two other cases, which-
Ian Bremmer:
Finland is an interesting one.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Well, Finland is being referenced quite often, but there is also a case of Alsace and Lorraine. For 41 years, these territories were under German control, legal German control. And yet they were taken back by France the moment the circumstances changed and Germany was weak, weakened to the extent that it couldn't defend them. Or there is another very traumatic example for the American audience, but Vietnam. I mean, North Vietnam was doomed. I mean, no one believed it could ever oppose such a great power as the United States. And in the end, North Vietnam got it all, and we have a unified Vietnam.
Ian Bremmer:
And a quite good relationship with the United States, tariffs notwithstanding.
Dmytro Kuleba:
With the United States. Well, yes. So there are many examples in history which have different territorial issues, which have different outcome. There is another story of Schleswig-Holstein, if that name makes any sense, used to be Danish for centuries and then ended up German. And Denmark accepted that it was German, has no claims. So many cases, many analogies to draw. But what is fundamentally important is that the moment you accept the fact that it doesn't belong to you, you'll lose it forever. And this is not what Ukrainians are going to do because politically, historically, and legally, this is ours.
Ian Bremmer:
Understood. That's very different from the notion that you could end this war. You could have a permanent ceasefire where the Ukrainians are not actually occupying that territory. So in other words, a historic claim, you're not going to give away the legitimacy, but the reality is a very different story.
Dmytro Kuleba:
But this is what politics are about. I mean, no president of Ukraine nor Ukrainian leader will be in a position to sign a paper that legally cedes any piece of territory to Russia or puts it under international control or anything else, for a very simple reason, because that person will know that the risk of him being assassinated by Ukrainian Patriot will surge immediately after the signing ceremony, and second, that the criminal case will immediately criminal case on the ground of committing high treason will immediately be opened against that person. Because it's in our law. These territories are ours by the law.
Ian Bremmer:
What Trump, what Trump has promised is he wants just to end the war. He wants to end the fighting. Do you think that if he were able to convince to pressure Putin into accepting a ceasefire, a permanent, where there's just no fighting with the territory where it is right now, maybe the Chinese help, maybe they don't, is that something that the Ukrainians, just that itself would be able to sign?
Dmytro Kuleba:
Trump can reach the ceasefire if he changes the current way he handles Ukraine and Russia, but Trump and no one else can end the war as long as Russia continues to believe that Ukraine is theirs. This is unfortunately a very grim reality that we exist in. The goal of the attempt of President Trump to end the war is commendable, okay? I do not question that, and I appreciate that he's trying. The problem is that the strategy that he pursues is to leverage Ukraine with sticks while leveraging Russia with carrots.
Ian Bremmer:
With primarily carrots.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Not primarily, exclusively carrots.
Ian Bremmer:
Not exclusively, but primarily.
Dmytro Kuleba:
He did nothing, except two or three posts on truth media, on truth social media, to make Putin seriously believe that Trump is ready to act. The moment I see him act on Russia, I will agree with you.
Ian Bremmer:
Yes, he hasn't acted. He has merely threatened, but those threats have clearly, the threats against Ukraine have been far more substantial.
Dmytro Kuleba:
And implemented. He's suspended assistance. He's suspended intelligence.
Ian Bremmer:
He's suspended intelligence.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Exactly. So he can achieve what he's seeking, which is the ceasefire, but he has to change his attitude towards Putin.
Ian Bremmer:
So Russia clearly should have been on that tariff list according to you.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Well, not only on that, but a very clear message that if you do not agree to the ceasefire, this is what is going to happen, "I will unleash military assistance to Ukraine. I will attack your oil shadow fleet and so forth." So this is the language that Putin understands. It's not that I'm kind of trying to redirect the anger on Putin, but this is the way of negotiations that he appreciates and takes with respect.
Ian Bremmer:
No, and in fact, I mean, as the former foreign minister, I mean, I think you should get some credit here. You are implicitly recognizing that actually those Trump sticks against your country, against your president were effective, but he's not willing to use those sticks against Russia. And as a consequence, he's not getting where he needs to get to make this deal work.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Of course, they are effective. And every day, every decision President Zelensky will be making, there will be a shadow of another suspension of military assistance or intel sharing weighing over him. Because he saw that it can work, that it happens. And you can be a strong character, but if your country runs out of Patriot interceptors and Russian ballistic missiles begin to destroy your cities at completely at an uncomparably larger scale, although the scale today is already terrifying, then you kind of understand what is at stake here. But this is the thing, you cannot be effective in pursuing your strategic goal, I'm speaking of President Trump, if you twist arms of a weaker country that was attacked and shake a hand of a country that is stronger and that attacked. It just doesn't work this way. History of diplomacy does not offer us any successful case proving that this kind of strategy delivered.
Ian Bremmer:
Dmytro Kuleba, thanks for joining us today.
Dmytro Kuleba:
Thank you.
Ian Bremmer:
That's it for today's edition of the GZERO World Podcast. Do you like what you heard? Of course you do. Why not make it official? Why don't you rate and review GZERO World five stars, only five stars, otherwise, don't do it, on Apple, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Tell your friends.