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For decades, French governments have talked up the value of “Collective European Defense,” an alliance fully invested in Europe’s security outside of NATO. For decades, the point was academic, because Germany and Britain valued the transatlantic relationship too highly to take steps that might discourage US commitment.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it again exposed Europe’s deep dependence on Washington’s commitment to its security. When Donald Trump returned to the White House in 2025, the risks of outsourcing Europe’s defense became unavoidably obvious. France and Germany (along with Poland) have now announced new European defense plans.
But there are two stories making headlines this week that reveal just how complex, time-consuming, and politically fraught these plans will be.
First, the European Commission has proposed that EU members be allowed to borrow against the EU budget to purchase $167 billion worth of weapons to help them quickly counter potential Russian threats.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen then told the European Parliament this week that, to invest in genuine European strategic autonomy, these funds should only be spenton weapons made in EU member states or allied countries like the UK, Norway, and Switzerland. Why buy American when you want to wean yourself off Washington? To be adopted, this plan must win backing from at least 55% of EU members and 65% of the EU’s total population.
True to French tradition, Paris would impose three conditions: France would not pay the cost of moving the weapons; redeployments must not be so large as to compromise France’s own nuclear deterrent; and any decision to use these weapons could only be made by the French president.
Both developments illustrate the scale of the political and security decisions that are being undertaken. It’s a good bet we’ll still be writing about the EU debating these questions for years to come.
Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, France's President Emmanuel Macron and Britain's Prime Minister Keir Starmer speak during a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of a summit for "Coalition of the Willing" at Elysee Palace in Paris, France March 27, 2025.
With Russia’s Vladimir Putin pressing forward on one side and America’s Donald Trump potentially stepping back on the other, curious new things are happening in the European defense sector.
The EU and the United Kingdom are now working toward adefense and security pact to be unveiled at a summit of European leaders hosted by UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer on May 19.
This will be the first such summit of EU and British leaders since “Brexit”. It comes at a time when the UK and France are leading an effort to form a “coalition of the willing” to safeguard any potential Russia-Ukraine ceasefire.
The new deal would allow British arms-makers, many with longstanding ties to German and other European defense companies, to participate in joint arms procurement to bolster European security.
The pact would also create a €150bn program that allows participating governments to borrow against a common fund to invest in critical military hardware, such as air and missile defense systems.
It’s not a done deal just yet. France in particular wants concessions from Starmer’s government on the hot political topic of fisheries access. But given the stakes, the right of French fishermen to catch sand eels in UK waters seems unlikely to stymie for long the broader progress towards a UK-EU security deal.
A member of German army Bundeswehr exercises during a presentation to German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius during his visit to the airborne brigade of German army Bundeswehr in Saarlouis, Germany, September 17, 2024
Earlier this week, Friedrich Merz, Germany’s chancellor-in-waiting, made an astounding declaration: “The Americans … are indifferent to the fate of Europe,” he said. “Europeans must … ensure that we are at least capable of defending the European continent on our own.”
To be clear, the US hasn’t stepped away from Europe’s security just yet. But Trump 3.0’s aggressive posture towards the EU – on trade, free speech, and Ukraine – has made the specter of abandonment feel real enough.
The EU would need to replace some 300,000 US troops, as well as hundreds of tanks and artillery pieces, according to one report. The yearly cost would be some $260 billion.
Such a rapid increase would need to be financed initially by borrowing. But that could clash with EU, and country-level, debt limits meant to avoid financial crises. In Germany, for example, Merz on Tuesday ruled out weakening the constitutionally mandated debt limits – but he is also reportedly working with the outgoing parliament to create a massive new defense fund.
In the UK, meanwhile, PM Keir Starmerannounced further cuts to the British foreign aid budget to boost defense spending to 3% of GDP by the middle of the next decade (from 2.3% today.)
What would “defense” mean? Holding Russia at bay in Ukraine would be a big focus. But beyond that, naming the threats that Western European countries face directly could be contentious. Keep an eye out for this Sunday’s emergency EU defense summit, which will touch on just that.
The bottom line: For decades, the US has underwritten Europe’s security. But Europe is now being forced to answer questions it never expected to ask.