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Assassination attempt shakes Colombia's political landscape
On Ian Bremmer’s World In 60 Seconds: Ian breaks down the assassination attempt on Colombia's presidential candidate, the US-China trade talks, and Canada plans to hit NATO's 2% defense target seven years early.
Ian's takeaways:
An assassination attempt on a Colombian presidential candidate highlights that “security continues to be a really serious problem,” as opposition momentum grows amid President Petro’s struggles.
On US-China trade, Ian says, “There is real progress happening,” as factory shutdown threats push both sides toward short-term stability, even if long-term trust remains elusive.
And Canada’s plan to hit NATO’s defense target early? “It’s about Trump,” Ian notes, as Ottawa moves to ease tensions with Washington ahead of 2025.
Burkina Faso’s junta leader Captain Ibrahim Traore attends the first ordinary summit of heads of state and governments of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in Niamey, Niger, on July 6, 2024.
Hard Numbers: Burkina Faso foils coup effort, Trump dents democracy rating, Spain to hit defense-spending target, Musk to reduce his DOGE hours, Migrants arrested while fleeing US, Japan rids foreign debt, Tourists killed in Kashmir
40%: Burkina Faso’s ruling military recently foiled an attempted coup aimed at removing junta leader Cap. Ibrahim Traoré, the country’s security minister said on Monday. The Sahel nation has had to deal with widespread insurgency in recent years, with rebel jihadist groups reportedly controlling around 40% of the country’s land mass.
55: US President Donald Trump made a dent in American democracy almost as soon as he won the 2024 election, according to a survey of 520 political experts. The Bright Line Watch benchmark gave US democracy a rating of 55 in February, down 12 points from where it was on the day of Trump’s election victory and 14 points from where it was in October 2024. It’s the country’s fastest drop since the survey began in 2017.
2%: Our globally minded readers will immediately recognize this figure as the proportion of gross domestic product that NATO member nations are encouraged to spend on defense. Under pressure from the Trump administration and its European allies to expand its military, Spain said Tuesday that it will finally hit that figure again this year, after falling short for over 30 years.
130: Elon Musk is DOGE-ing himself. The Tesla CEO says he will cut back his role in the government after his electric vehicle company reported a massive profit drop. Musk says he will spend just one to two days each week on DOGE following accusations that he has let his focus on Tesla slip. Regardless, temporary government employees like Musk are normally limited to working 130 days a year, which would expire at the end of May.
8: So much for the Great Escape: From January through April, US authorities arrested eight undocumented Dominican migrants in Puerto Rico who were trying to return to their home country. The arrests raise questions over the Trump administration’s stated goal of encouraging undocumented migrants to leave of their own accord.
$20 billion: Trump’s tariffs have Tokyo in a selling mood. Japanese investors said sayonara to more than $20 billion of foreign debt early this month. The selloff shows how Wall Street jitters can ripple across the Pacific. It’s not clear which foreign debt Japanese investors unloaded, though they are the largest holders of US Treasuries of any country worldwide, so their investment choices are observed hawkishly.
26: Outrage is rising after gunmen killed 26 tourists in Indian-administered Kashmir’s Pahalgam on Tuesday. Several other victims remain critically injured. The Resistance Front – believed to be an offshoot of Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba – has claimed responsibility.
Will Trump pressure Putin for a Ukraine ceasefire?
On the campaign trail, Donald Trump said ending the war in Ukraine would be easy. Again and again, he promised to end the fighting within “24 hours” of taking office. But as president, and as Russia drags its feet in ceasefire negotiations, Trump has walked that confidence back. On Ian Explains, Ian Bremmer looks at President Trump’s push for a ceasefire deal in Ukraine and what it will take to bring both sides to the negotiating table. The Trump administration has been engaging diplomatically with Moscow and making it clear to Kyiv that ongoing US support isn’t a guarantee.
The problem is that so far, the Kremlin seems uninterested in meaningful compromise. Instead, it’s been slow-walking negotiations and increasing its demands for concessions, all while advancing on the battlefield and targeting Ukraine’s population centers with drone strikes. Turns out, diplomacy is a lot more complicated than a Manhattan real estate deal: complex, slow, and full of people who don’t care about self-imposed deadlines. But there are signs that the president’s patience with Moscow is wearing thin. As Russia keeps stalling, will Trump start piling the pressure on Putin to make a ceasefire happen?
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
The end of the transatlantic relationship as we know it
Donald Trump’s second term is having considerably more impact on the global stage than his first. Trump may have been a largely transactional president last time around, when he was more constrained at home and faced relatively more powerful counterparts abroad. But the first two months of Trump 2.0 have shattered the illusion of continuity. No American ally faces a ruder awakening than Europe, whose relationship with the United States is now fundamentally damaged.
Core partners in Asia like Japan, South Korea, India, as well as Australia worry about being hit with tariffs and will do what they can to defuse conflict, but they also know their geostrategic position vis-à-vis China means Trump can’t afford to alienate them entirely. Accordingly, their relations with Washington should remain comparatively stable over the next four years.
America’s largest trade partners, Mexico and Canada, are facing more significant trade pressures from the Trump administration, but the imbalance of power is such that they have no credible strategy to push back. Everyone understands they’ll have to accept Trump’s terms eventually; the only question is whether capitulation comes before or after a costly fight. Riding an 85% job approval, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum has enough domestic political space to yield to Trump’s demands to keep Mexico in his good graces, as she is already doing. By contrast, Canadian leaders have a political incentive to put up a bigger fight because Trump’s threats toward Canada’s economy and sovereignty have sharply inflamed nationalist sentiment north of the border in the run-up to the April 28 elections. However, I expect Ottawa will quietly fold shortly after the vote to ensure that ongoing relations with the US remain functional.
Most US allies have no choice but to absorb Trump’s demands and hope for a reset after he’s gone. But Europe is different. It possesses both the collective heft to resist Trump’s demands and the existential imperative to do so.
Three structural forces render the transatlantic rupture permanent.
First, the European Union has the trade competency and market size to punch back against the Trump administration’s aggressive tariff blitz. Unlike most other US trading partners who lack the economic leverage to go toe-to-toe against Washington and have little choice but to fold under pressure, Brussels’ defiance ensures a protracted trade war with no easy resolution.
Second, most Europeans view the Trump administration’s unilateral pursuit of rapprochement with Russia as a direct threat to their national security. While President Trump would still like to end the war in Ukraine as he promised on the campaign trail, he is prepared to do so on the Kremlin’s terms – and he’s even more interested in business deals with Moscow. He won’t be deterred by a collapse of the Ukraine peace talks, even though it’s Vladimir Putin who’s shown no interest in softening his maximalist demands. Nor will Trump care that the Europeans stridently oppose US normalization with their principal enemy. After all, the United States is protected by two oceans from Putin’s army, and Trump’s embrace of Euroskeptic movements reveals their shared aim: a fragmented and weakened Europe that is easier to dominate.
The president’s rhetoric – echoed by the Signal-gate private texts, Special Envoy Steve Witkoff’s recent interview with Tucker Carlson, Vice President JD Vance’s Munich speech, and so many other pieces of evidence – makes clear that the current administration sees Europeans not as allies but as “pathetic freeloaders” who shouldn’t be “bailed out” as a matter of principle. Even if Washington begrudgingly agrees to provide them with transactional security, Europeans now realize that relying on a hostile US for survival is strategic suicide.
Which brings us to the third and final driver of the definitive US-Europe break: common values … or lack thereof. From free trade and collective security to territorial integrity and the rule of law, Europe’s foundational principles are now anathema to Trump’s America. Just look at Trump’s repeated threats to annex Greenland, to say nothing of his willingness to recognize illegally annexed Ukrainian territories as Russian and support Israel’s annexation of parts of the West Bank and Gaza. For an EU built from the ashes of World War II, it's hard to compromise with a worldview in which borders are mere suggestions and might makes right.
After years of complacency, European leaders seem to have finally gotten the message that the United States under Trump is not just an unreliable friend but an actively hostile power. They understand they need to drastically increase Europe’s sovereign military, technological, and economic capabilities – not just to survive without America but also to defend their borders, economies, and democracies against it. Whether they can muster the political mettle to act on this realization, however, is Europe’s greatest test since 1945.
Recent moves – Germany’s historic debt brake reform and Brussels’ fiscal and financial maneuvers to boost defense spending – hint at urgency. Yet half measures won’t suffice. If Europeans refuse to commit troops to guarantee Ukraine’s post-ceasefire security absent an American backstop and continue to balk at seizing Russia’s frozen assets and overriding Hungary’s veto, it will confirm my view that the bloc lacks the nerve to survive in a jungle-ruled world where Trump and Putin refuse to play by any rules.
The irony is that Europe has the resources and capacity to stand up for itself, its values, and its fellow Europeans. What’s missing is the collective courage to act like it’s 1938, not 1989. For Ukraine’s sake and its own, that needs to change.
Trump is increasingly hostile to Europe, says Zanny Minton Beddoes
As Trump’s second term unfolds, European leaders are no longer just questioning America’s reliability—they’re beginning to worry that the US is actively hostile. Economist editor-in-chief Zanny Minton Beddoes points to growing frustration across the continent, and it's not just about America's reliability on defense. Trump’s aggressive trade policies, including escalating tariffs on European goods, have compounded the rift. “You have an anger at the United States amongst its allies that is damaging,” Beddoes warns.
But beyond policy, it’s Trump’s approach to foreign relations that is sparking the greatest alarm. Beddoes argues that his White House operates with a “mafia mobster kind of foreign policy,” where allies are strong-armed rather than supported. The result? Europe is starting to hedge its bets, strengthening its own defense industries and reducing economic reliance on the U.S. If Trump continues treating allies like adversaries, they may start acting accordingly.
Watch full episode: Trump’s trade war: Who really wins?
GZERO World with Ian Bremmer, the award-winning weekly global affairs series, airs nationwide on US public television stations (check local listings).
New digital episodes of GZERO World are released every Monday on YouTube. Don't miss an episode: subscribe to GZERO's YouTube channel and turn on notifications (🔔).GZERO World with Ian Bremmer airs on US public television weekly - check local listings.
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Is Europe in trouble as the US pulls away?
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: I want to talk about the transatlantic relationship. The US relationship with Europe. Because of all of the geopolitics in the world, this is the one that I think has been impacted in a permanent and structural way in the first two months of the Trump administration. I wouldn't say that, for example, look at the Middle East and US relations with Israel, the Saudis, the Emiratis, the rest of the Gulf States, frankly, all very comfortable with Trump. If there's a significant change, I would say it's incrementally more engaged, and in terms of worldview than under the Biden administration. Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, you look at Asia relations and certainly Trump and the US on trade worrying them, making them sort of react in a more defensive posture. Seeing how much, how more quickly, they can get something to the US that will lead to trying to diffuse potential conflict there. But not radically different from the way they thought about the United States in 2017 in the first Trump term.
Mexico, Canada, Panama, here you've got countries that are facing very significant challenges from the United States, but also ultimately understand that they have no other options. Now, in Canada, that's a bigger fight because there are elections coming up at the end of April. But after those elections are over, I certainly expect that they will move quickly to try to ensure that ongoing relations are functional and stable. That's already true for the Mexican government with a president who has 85% approval, can do pretty much everything necessary to ensure that US-Mexico relations aren't dramatically impacted by everything Trump is demanding. So that's everywhere else.
But in Europe, that's just not the case. Three different reasons why the Europeans are facing a much more permanent impact. The first is on the trade side, like everybody else, and trade is well within the European Union's competency. They understand that they have leverage. If the Americans are going to hit them with significant tariffs, they're going to hit back with the same numbers. But that doesn't mean it's going to be relatively difficult and take a long time to resolve it, as opposed to places that are much weaker where they just fold quickly to the United States. Okay, fair enough. But still, that's not all that dramatically different from first term. Second point is there's a war going on in Ukraine, and the United States has made it very clear that they want to engage, to re-engage with Putin, who is Europe's principal enemy. And they're going to do that irrespective of how much the Europeans oppose it, and they're not going to take any European input in those conversations.
Trump would like a rapprochement with Russia to include a Ukrainian ceasefire. But if that doesn't happen, he is oriented towards blaming the Ukrainians for it, towards taking Kremlin talking points on Ukraine not really being a country, and then on moving to ensure that US-Russia relations are functional again. All of that is deeply concerning, is existentially concerning, particularly for a bunch of European countries that are on the front lines spending a lot more in defense, not because the Americans are telling them to, but because they're worried about Russia themselves, feel like they have to be more independent. Then finally, because Europe is the supranational political experiment that relies most on common values and rule of law, and the United States under Trump is undoing that component of the US-led order specifically.
I wouldn't necessarily say that about collective security or existing alliances and willingness to provide some sort of defense umbrella, but I would certainly say that in terms of rule of law and territorial integrity. And here, the fact that the United States no longer really cares about territorial integrity, is prepared to tell Denmark, "Hey, you're not a good ally. You're not defending Greenland. We're interested in moving forward ourselves, and we don't care how you've treated us historically. We're going to send our leaders and we're going to cut our own deal inside your territory." That's exactly the way the Germans felt when JD Vance said that he wanted to engage directly with the Alternatives für Deutschland, who the Germans consider to be a neo-Nazi party.
Everything that's core to the Europeans in their statehood and in the EU, the United States under Trump is on the other side of that, and it's increasingly conflictual. It's directly adversarial. And so I would say number one, the Europeans are aware of these problems. Number two, they're taking them late, but nonetheless finally very seriously. And so they understand that the Europeans are going to have to create an independent strategy for their own self-defense, for their national security, for their political stability, for their democracies, and they have to do that outside of the United States. In fact, they have to do that and defend themselves against the United States.
Now that reality doesn't mean they're going to be successful. And indeed, the more summits I see on Ukraine, frankly the less I have been convinced that the Europeans will be able to do enough, quick enough to really help Ukraine dramatically cut a better deal with the Russian Federation that is very uninterested in doing anything that is sustainable for the Ukrainians long term. It makes me worry that the EU longer term is not fit for purpose in an environment where the principle, the most powerful actors don't care about rule of law. The United States, China, and for Europe, Russia right on their borders. So for all of those reasons, I mean, the European markets have gone up recently. European growth expectations have gone up because the Germans and others are planning on spending a lot more, that's short-term. Long-term here. I worry that the Europeans are in an awful lot of trouble. So something we'll be focusing on very closely going forward over the coming weeks and months. I hope you all are well, and I'll talk to you all real soon.
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Putin-Trump Ukraine call is a small win for both sides
Ian Bremmer's Quick Take: The Putin-Trump call, some 90 minutes long, now over. And I would call this a win for both sides, for the Americans and the Russians, and not horrible for Ukraine and Europe, but kicking the can on what's going to be some big problems down the road and setting out where those challenges are going to be. Why is that?
Well, first of all, Putin said, "No," to the 30-day complete ceasefire, but did give a win to Trump, having accepted a 30-day ceasefire with no conditions with the Ukrainians. The Russians are saying they're prepared to do that, with no gives, as long as it's about targeting energy infrastructure, and in principle, still some discussions around maritime attacks around the Black Sea. Places that frankly the Russians have been irritated with what Ukraine has been able to do with air drones and with sea drones. And also allows the Russians to continue to press for territorial gains over the course of the coming weeks, depleting Ukraine's military capabilities. Plus, the weather's getting warmer, how much damage are you going to do to Ukraine, how miserable you can make them when you're no longer dealing with the freeze is not quite as relevant. So, not a particular loss for the Russians.
The fact that you're going to have less engagement militarily means fewer people will get killed. That's good for everybody involved, frankly. So that's where we are. Did you need 90-minutes to get that going? Not really, because the Russians also want to ensure that they have lots of conversations with the Americans about building business between the two sides, about people-to-people engagement, about finding a way to ensure that there is an ongoing bilateral channel where the Europeans aren't involved, where the Ukrainians aren't involved, that's essential for Putin and that he got. So yes, you have a meaningful, relatively contained ceasefire that maybe you can build on, but you also have a meaningful bilateral channel for broader engagement between the Americans and the Russians that the Ukrainians and the Europeans aren't going to be a part of, and that the Americans have no interest in having the Ukrainians Europeans being a part of.
Now, what Trump has heard from Putin in terms of red lines is that to actually have a comprehensive ceasefire ongoing, that the Russians are demanding, that there is no further intelligence or military support to Ukraine from the United States or Europe. That's obviously a non-starter for the Ukrainians because it means they won't be able to defend themselves as the Russians rebuild. It's a non-starter for the Europeans for similar reasons. Trump might be willing to negotiate that, and if he is, then he and Putin can blame Ukraine and the Europeans for not being able to take a 30-day limited ceasefire and expand it, which is exactly the position that Putin wants to be in. So, Putin giving a little bit in the near-term with the hopes of getting a lot more in the longer-term, getting Trump as it were, a little bit pregnant around a deal so that he's more engaged with the Russians in areas that's going to be more consequential and more costly for Europe and for the Ukrainians.
So that's where we are. We don't know yet whether the Ukrainians are going to accept these limited 30-day terms. I expect they will, because Trump wants them to. And when that happens, the Europeans will be onboard, too. The intention will be to try to use that by the Ukrainians, the Europeans, to try to get a longer, broader ceasefire. But there, the working level conversations between the US and Russia, between the US and Ukraine, are going to be far more difficult and they're probably not going to hold.
It feels a little bit like what we have in Gaza. Relatively easy to get the first iteration of a deal in place where no one's really giving anything up, but as you go into the second phase, you find that the fundamental interests don't actually overlap, and that's why we're fighting again on the ground in Gaza, with the Israelis killing hundreds of people there in the last 24-hours, and it's why I expect ultimately we are not heading towards peace, even though we do get a temporary ceasefire with Ukraine.
Trump demands Putin sign ceasefire
Trump has no cards. #PUPPETREGIME
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