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An Iranian newspaper with a cover photo of US President Donald Trump and US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, is seen in Tehran, Iran, on May 11, 2025.
What We’re Watching: US and Iran near mini-deal, Europe election extravaganza, Diss tracks at Eurovision
US and Iran edge toward “mini-deal” on nukes
US President Donald Trump said Thursday that the US and Iran have “sort of” agreed on terms for a nuclear deal, one day after a top Iranian adviser said Tehran is willing to eliminate weapons-grade uranium, limit enrichment, and allow international inspections — if sanctions are lifted immediately. But dismantling their nuclear program or ability to enrich uranium, as per the Iran nuclear deal negotiated in 2015, is off the table.
“While a full-scale deal like the [2015 deal] appears unlikely, both sides are showing interest in a limited ‘mini-deal’ that reduces tensions and creates more space for diplomacy,” says Eurasia Group Iran expert Gregory Brew. “A win for Trump and for his new friends in the Gulf.”
Election extravaganza: Big weekend for Europe
There will be a trio of elections on the continent this Sunday. Here’s a quick roundup of who’s voting and where.
Poland: The first round of the presidential election takes place this weekend, pitting Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, a centrist, against the right-wing Law and Justice leader Karol Nawrocki. The election will be a harbinger of Poland’s alignment with the European Union at a vital time for the bloc. Polls have Trzaskowski ahead, but well short of 50%, which means there will likely be a runoff between the two front-runners on June 1.
Portugal: The Iberian nation is holding its third election in as many years, leaving some of the electorate fed up with its stagnant government. Polls suggest the situation isn’t about to get better: Prime Minister Luis Montenegro’s center-right Democratic Alliance is ahead but doesn’t have enough support to gain a working majority.
Romania: Of all the elections this weekend, it’s the one in Bucharest that is garnering the most attention, after the Romanian Constitutional Court barred nationalist candidate Călin Georgescu from running over allegations of Russian meddling. George Simion has filled Georgescu’s shoes and will seek to triumph over the pro-EU candidate Nicusor Dan. With polls tied, the race is on a knife-edge.
At Eurovision 2025: Glitter, geopolitics, and a sauna diss track
Europe’s glitter-soaked, pyrotechnic-powered music competition fever dream — otherwise known as the Eurovision Song Contest — takes place Saturday at 9 p.m. CET (3 p.m. ET). It’s part talent show, part geopolitical popularity contest, and fully unhinged fun.
Unlike in the past two years, politics is taking a relative back seat this time around. However, there are two diss tracks. Sweden’s “Bara Bada Bastu” — the odds-on favorite — roasts Finland’s love of saunas, while Estonia’s viral “Espresso Macchiato” mocks Italian language and American work culture. Mamma mia!
Trump x Khamenei nuclear duet
The US and Iran are holding nuclear talks again: What kind of song and dance is preventing a new deal? #PUPPETREGIME
Watch more of GZERO's award-winning PUPPET REGIME series!
Trump and Khamenei staring at eachother across an Iranian flag.
Will Trump’s Iran strategy actually prevent war?
The United States is ramping up its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran.
In a letter sent to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early March, President Donald Trump gave Tehran an ultimatum: reach a new nuclear deal with the US within two months or face direct military action – “bombing the likes of which they have never seen before,” as he told NBC News’ Kristen Welker on Sunday.
The letter proposed mediation by the United Arab Emirates (whose emissaries delivered the missive in question) and expressed Trump’s preference for a diplomatic solution. “I would rather have a peace deal than the other option, but the other option will solve the problem,” the president said.
In the three weeks it took the Iranian leadership to figure out how to respond, the US turned up the temperature.
First came intense airstrikes (of Signalgate fame) against Iran’s last remaining functional ally in the region, the Houthis in Yemen, starting on March 15 and continuing to this day. Then, the US issued its first-ever sanctions against Chinese entities for buying Iranian crude oil, including a “teapot” refinery in Shandong and an import and storage terminal in Guangzhou. And in recent days, the US military deployed a fleet of B-2 stealth bombers – capable of carrying the 30,000-lb. bunker-busting bombs needed to blast through Iran’s hardened enrichment sites – to its Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean, in range of both Yemen and Iran. This move was “not unrelated” to Trump’s ultimatum, according to a senior US official.
Iran finally rejected direct negotiations with the US in a formal response to Trump’s letter delivered last Thursday via Oman, its preferred mediator. President Masoud Pezeshkian stated on Sunday that although the Islamic Republic won’t speak directly with the Trump administration while maximum pressure is in place, Tehran is willing to engage with Washington indirectly through the Omanis.
Whether Trump’s two-month deadline was to strike a deal or to begin negotiations remains unclear. Either way, there’s no chance that two sides that deeply mistrust each other – especially after Trump unilaterally withdrew from the original nuclear deal in 2018 – could reach an agreement over issues as complex as Iran’s nuclear program and support for regional proxies in just a couple, or a few, months (let alone a single one).
But does that mean that Trump’s ultimatum is doomed to end in confrontation? Not necessarily. In fact, his “escalate to de-escalate” strategy could be the best hope to avoid a crisis this year.
A ticking time bomb
While US intelligence assesses that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon, it has become a threshold nuclear state with enough 60% enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons (if enriched to 90%) and the ability to “dash to a bomb” in about six months (though weaponizing a device would probably take it 1-2 years).
European governments have long made it clear that unless Iran reins in its enrichment activities by this summer, they will “snap back” the UN sanctions that were lifted as part of the 2015 nuclear deal before the agreement expires in October and they can no longer do so.
Iran has vowed to respond to snapback sanctions by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Given the precedent set by North Korea – whose NPT exit in 2003 was followed by ever-greater steps toward weaponization – and the already advanced state of Tehran’s nuclear program, NPT withdrawal could be the action-forcing event Israel needs to convince Trump to support a joint strike on Iran’s underground nuclear facilities.
Which means that the US and Iran were likely headed for a collision later this year even if Trump hadn’t issued his ultimatum.
Strange bedfellows
And yet, both Trump and Iran’s leadership would much prefer to avoid a military confrontation in the near term.
Trump’s political coalition includes both traditional Republican war hawks and “America First” isolationists who are averse to US involvement in new forever wars. Whereas cabinet officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth advocate for a more combative approach toward the Islamic Republic, none of these prominent national security hawks are in charge of the Iran file – Middle East Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, a Washington outsider and a restrainer, is.
Most importantly, Trump ran as a peacemaker and has repeatedly stated his preference for a deal, believing that bombing Iran could mire the US in an unpopular war that’d divert precious resources from his domestic priorities and endanger his friends in the Gulf for little political upside. The solidly MAGA Vice President JD Vance echoed this concern when, in the leaked Signal group chat, he flagged the risk to oil prices from striking the Houthis for the sake of “bailing out” the Europeans.
For its part, Iran is historically vulnerable and eager to negotiate a deal that brings sanctions relief to its battered economy. While capitulating to Trump’s demands is politically dangerous for Khamenei and would weaken the regime’s domestic position, neither he nor other hardliners would welcome a military showdown with the US and Israel.
Take it or leave it
The threat of a crisis later this year creates an opening for Trump to pressure Tehran into offering concessions that allow the US president to claim progress and avoid triggering snapback sanctions.
Last year’s effective destruction of Iran’s regional proxy network – Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria – dealt a blow to the country’s conventional deterrence and heightened the importance of its nuclear program. Iran will therefore resist making any meaningful concessions on this front. If there’s one piece of the nuclear file it could cede ground on, it’s its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium, which Tehran could conceivably agree to freeze.
Where Iran could potentially offer more is in backing away from its proxies, at least temporarily. Though it doesn’t have operational control over the Houthis (unlike the decimated Hezbollah), the Islamic Republic could deprive them of the bulk of the weapons systems and intelligence they rely on to attack Red Sea shipping lanes. It could also instruct Shia militias in Iraq to refrain from targeting US troops.
The regime would find these choices politically and ideologically unpalatable. But with its so-called Axis of Resistance already in shambles and little Tehran can do to rebuild it in the near term, its strategic value is nowhere near what it was a year ago. A chance at avoiding a snapback and US bombing could accordingly be seen as a worthwhile trade.
Less for less
While a breakthrough agreement is highly unlikely to be reached before the summer (or at all), the two sides’ mutual desire to avoid escalation suggests that Trump would be receptive to the relatively minor concessions Tehran could be willing to make – the most it can conceivably offer under the circumstances.
But those concessions would need to come soon, before snapback is triggered. And even this best-case scenario wouldn’t buy Iran any sanctions relief. Instead, they’d get to kick the can on snapback sanctions and possible US military action while negotiations on a more comprehensive – and aspirational – deal are underway.
If, however, Iran’s modest concessions fall short of what Trump deems acceptable, the risk of military escalation this year will rise sharply – either when Trump’s ultimatum comes to a head or when snapback gets triggered, Iran exits the NPT, and Israel considers a strike (whether solo or joint with the US).
Iran has not yet made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. And unless it’s attacked, it remains unlikely to do so, knowing full well that any overt steps toward weaponization would invite certain, immediate, and devastating retaliation. But nothing would make the Islamic Republic dash for a bomb more than getting bombed.
Biden team struggles to define clear Iran strategy
Joe Biden may be one of the most experienced foreign policy presidents in recent history, but even he might admit that, at the moment, his administration is lacking a coherent Iran strategy. According to Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Karim Sadjadpour, the White House's primary aim before October 7th had been to revive the Iran nuclear deal, but that hasn't materialized. Instead, the situation has become more escalatory, which is undesirable for both the US and Iran. Sadjadpour acknowledges that Iran may choose to advance its nuclear program and increase attacks on U.S. forces and Israel if they believe the Biden administration is averse to conflict. And it helps the American popular support for another Mideast war is near zero.
"The challenge that the Biden administration faces is that, on the one hand, they want to avert conflict with Iran, but if you want to deter Iran, you have to make clear to them there's gonna be a cost for that kind of behavior," Sadjadpour told Ian Bremmer on the latest episode of GZERO World.
Watch the full interview: What’s Iran’s next move?
Catch GZERO World with Ian Bremmer every week at gzeromedia.com/gzeroworld or on US public television. Check local listings.
Was leaving the Iran deal a good idea?
It's now been two years since Donald Trump announced US withdrawal from what he called the "horrible one-sided" Iran nuclear deal.
The pact, brokered in 2015 by the Obama administration along with Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the Iranians, aimed to limit Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in exchange for the repeal of some US and international economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
Trump – along with many US conservatives and the Israeli government – argued that the deal was a dangerous failure because it didn't impose strict enough limits on Iran's nuclear program and because sanctions relief boosted Tehran's ability to make trouble in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.
Though Washington walked, the other signatories (outside Iran) have continued to abide by the deal's terms – Europe, in particular, has done its best to offer Iran economic and financial incentives to keep Tehran from pulling out altogether.
So, has Washington's withdrawal achieved its purpose? Depends on what the move was really meant to accomplish. Let's go down the list.
Stopping Iran's nuclear weapons progress. With the US out, Iran has stopped adhering to the deal's guidelines on uranium enrichment. Over the past six months, Iran has (at least) tripled its stockpiles of enriched uranium, according to the UN. It has also conducted several new missile tests and recently launched a satellite, a move that the Pentagon sees as potential cover for testing long-range ballistic missiles.
Clipping Iran's wings in the Middle East by crippling its economy. US sanctions on Iran's oil exports and financial transactions have devastated Iran's economy – after soaring by 12.5 percent in the wake of the deal, the country's GDP has shrunk 13 percent since. And low oil prices aren't helping.
But over the past two years, Tehran has harassed oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, shot down a US drone, and increased its proxy attacks on US troops in the region. Don't forget the strike on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil facility, carried out either by Iran itself or its proxies in Yemen. That attack briefly knocked 5 percent of the world's oil production offline last September. Tehran is still a dominant player in Iraq, even if that country's new prime minister wants to limit Iran's direct influence. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad remains Iran's Man in Damascus (or at least, a time-share with Russia). And Iran-backed Hezbollah still has formidable power in Lebanon, despite recent anti-government protests.
In sum, Iran is certainly operating with less money and more domestic economic pressures than before — but sanctions haven't blunted Iran's regional ambitions.
Scrapping an Obama achievement. President Trump made good on a campaign promise to blow up one of his predecessor's few tangible foreign-policy achievements. But hopes that intense new pressure on Iran would force its leaders to accept a tougher deal, one with Trump's name on it, have (so far) been dashed. Tehran will certainly be watching closely to see if Trump can win re-election in November.
Pressuring the regime politically. This is harder to judge. Over the past two years, Iran's streets have erupted with massive protests over economic issues, corruption, and the downing of a Ukrainian airliner. Each time, the US has encouraged the protesters, while Iranian authorities have cracked down and weathered the storm. For now, Iran's particularly bad coronavirus outbreak has limited protesters' willingness to hit the streets.
In some ways the US pressure campaign has emboldened Iran's hardline clerics and military leaders, who never wanted to compromise on Iran's nuclear program in the first place and are happy with a more isolated economy that they can better control and exploit. That makes any new deal less likely.
Still, it remains to be seen whether a regime struggling to balance economic collapse, a public health crisis, and a web of foreign entanglements can continue to hold up, and for how long.