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The world awaiting the Class of 2025
Last week, I had the privilege and pleasure of serving as commencement speaker for graduates of the School of Liberal Arts at Tulane University, my alma mater. And the venue was the Louisiana Superdome, a little bigger of a house than I’m used to.
It was a great day for me, and I’ll always be grateful to Tulane for the invitation. But it was a sobering experience too. It’s one thing to look out over a crowd of this year’s graduates, young women and men who are well prepared for challenges ahead but who may not yet appreciate just how messed up our world is right now. It’s quite another when you’re looking into the faces of this year’s graduates of your alma mater. The people who now sit where you sat. It makes me more aware of how just much has happened on the road from 1989 to 2025 – how much we couldn’t have imagined.
Here's the speech in full…
It’s great to be back at Tulane.
And I'm honored to be your distinguished alum.
I realize it's possible you've decided to give me this award because you neglected to look into my time here as a student.
I was 15 when I came to Tulane, a kid from the projects outside Boston. I went to an all-boys Catholic high school. This led to an unusually exciting freshman year. I lied about my age, both for drinking purposes (which I had never done before), and also for dating purposes (which I had also never done before).
I missed classes, slept through a final, had a 1.9 GPA my first term. When they put me on probation and threatened to send me home to Boston, I figured I should spend less time at the Boot and more time in my classes.
In the end, I graduated without further public controversy. For me, Tulane was a laboratory of people and personalities, of studies and learning, of theory and of facts on the ground. I have the school of liberal arts to thank that I can tell the difference.
But when I graduated, I realized that no one actually hired political scientists, and so I decided to start a company to persuade people that political science mattered. Thirty years later, I've made a career of it. I’ve made it possible for at least a few political scientists to have jobs doing just that.
I suppose that’s the reason I’m receiving Tulane's distinguished alumni award (and truly, I am honored by it). But at the same time, I am a little bummed out about it, because compared to pretty much all of the parents here, I am failing most dramatically in my broader professional efforts. It's tough to be a political scientist right now. The stuff I work on — helping understand political leaders, governments, the world order — it's all falling apart.
Back when I graduated this was not true. I was class of 1989. That's the year you want to graduate as a political scientist. The Wall came down. We won the cold war. Collective security, free trade, rule of law, democracy. For everybody.
The problem is that we were winners, but we weren't leaders. The leaders were the people that won back in World War II and that created the world order on the ashes of that destroyed world. The Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, General MacArthur rebuilding Japan. The United Nations. The US-led global order.
Today, we've grown too comfortable as the most powerful country in that world, with the almighty dollar, the only global military, the top global businesses, and the best universities. We are in the most stable part of the world, with generally friendly neighbors (at least until we started fighting with them). Protected by both great oceans.
For generations now we have been the most privileged nation, but our own political system has become the most dysfunctional among rich democracies. Most everyone agrees on this. We even agree on who to blame. It's the “other guys.
So, what are we going to do about it? I use my voice to be speak up about it. We can't fix a problem until we identify it. I get things wrong, but I say what I truly believe in the hopes that helps other people do the same.
Because when we stand up, when law firms stand up, when universities stand up, courage is contagious. We have to show people a way.
Tulane class of 2025, what will you do about it?
First, you already have. You chose the liberal arts, which means, at some point, you made a conscious decision to pursue ideas over income – at least initially. It’s brave. It’s noble. It’s…confusing to your family.
But what you’ve been doing here matters, because while engineers are out there designing drones, you’ve been asking the more important question: who gets to decide where they fly? While business schools are simulating markets, you’ve been asking: who is this economy actually working for? While accountants are balancing the books, you've been asking: why do we pay taxes?
Let’s talk about the world you’re walking into. It’s no 1989, but it’s lively. We’ve got a climate crisis, a technology arms race, and a bunch of hot wars. We’ve got global alliances falling apart, superpowers behaving like exes who keep texting each other at 2AM, and a US domestic political environment that feels like a mad libs game with too many sazeracs.
But I’m not here to depress you. That’s what Twitter’s for.
I'm here to remind you: this is your moment. And no, not in the “you are the future” way that commencement speakers love to say before the parents applaud them. I mean you actually have an edge. You studied complexity. You learned that history doesn’t repeat, but it does plagiarize. You know that “unprecedented” really just means we didn’t study the past closely enough. You know that context is what matters, and that headlines don't tell the story. In a world of polarization, you’ve studied nuance. In a time of information overload, you’ve practiced discernment. In an age obsessed with outcomes, you’ve explored meaning.
Hopefully you have also learned along the way that -- ChatGPT notwithstanding -- hard work does pay off.
So, let me point out that all of those skills I just mentioned don’t just make for good leaders. Those skills make for good people.
Understanding complexity, believing that there is value in the truth, seeking the good in people, and looking beyond the moment right in front of you. Those are skills you need for life.
And you’re in it right now. A lot of ambitious young people set out these markers of achievement for themselves, and of course you’re sitting here on top of a big one. Having achieved one, you push for the next, and so you might think my real adult life begins when I get my first job, when I get out of grad school, when I buy my first home. Don’t do that. Your real adult life is already here. You’ll make mistakes, and you’ll have regrets. But you grow from them.
If you stay true to the skills and values that you’ve learned here, if you care about the family and friends that have moved you forward, your life will be rich, whatever path you choose.
So, what should you do with your liberal arts degree? Whatever you want.
Some of you will go into journalism, helping us understand a world spinning faster by the day. Others will work in policy, trying to keep the world from setting itself on fire – literally and metaphorically. Some will become artists, storytellers, teachers, nonprofit leaders, or the only ethics advisor at a tech company full of Stanford dropouts. That job will be important.
I’m not saying it’ll be easy. Your algorithms will try to convince you every day that nuance doesn't matter, and that more stuff and money will make you happy. Fight against that. Stay curious. Stay human. Stay weird, but the good kind of weird – the kind that doesn’t let cynicism turn into detachment.
And please, when you start running things – because trust me that day is sooner than you think – remember what you learned here: that ethics without power doesn't accomplish much, and that power without ethics is what got us here.
I'm counting on you, Tulane graduates. I’m counting on you to be as welcoming to weirdo strangers as you were to me as a 15-year-old freshman.
I’m counting on you to use new technologies, especially AI, that allow for innovation—improving your own capabilities—inconceivable when I graduated.
I’m counting on you to be curious as the world changes around us, to connect more closely with those that are different from you, and to recognize your connections with one another in spite of those differences.
I'm counting on you to be admired not because of your money and privilege but because you act the way others know they should.
I'm counting on you to be inspiring not because of your charisma and personality, but because you set the standard. I'm counting on you to be leaders again. Because if you don't, we're leaving it to the finance majors.
Tulane graduates, I believe in you. My thanks for giving me the opportunity to tell you that.
And congratulations to you on this most important day.
Collage of Ian Bremmer, Donald Trump, and other world leaders.
American backsliding, Trump-Xi standoff, Iran bombing, and more: Your questions, answered
If you feel like you're drowning in the 24-hour news tsunami lately, you're not alone. Headlines are moving at the speed of light, massively consequential policies are being announced (then rolled back) via social media, and longstanding global alliances seem to shift with each passing day. It's hard enough just trying to keep up, let alone separate the signal from the noise.
Because a weekly long-form column often can't do justice to everything happening simultaneously across our increasingly chaotic world, I invited readers to ask their most pressing questions on all things political and geopolitical. You wanted to know about everything from the contents of Donald Trump’s heart to the risk of a Taiwan invasion to the future of the dollar and, yes, whether I'd ride Moose like a moose jockey given the opportunity.
Below is the first batch of answers, with questions lightly edited for clarity. If you have something you’d like to ask me, submit your questions here and I’ll take as many as I can in the upcoming weeks.
Let's dive in.
How well do you think the outside world truly understands the goals and motivations of the Trump administration?
Not particularly well, since it's unclear for people in the United States, too. President Trump individually concentrates so much more decision-making authority than any other president in modern US history, which is why the on-again-off-again tariff policy has been so chaotic. Past administrations have not necessarily been more transparent – Trump certainly speaks his mind constantly – but they have been far more process and consensus-driven.
Still, there is an underlying driver helping explain Trump’s actions: the use and abuse of power to bring about the president’s favored outcomes in one-on-one settings and, relatedly, to eliminate any checks on his authority domestically (vis-à-vis Congress and the courts) and internationally (multilateral frameworks, standards, commitments, treaties, agreements, etc.). That – Trump’s will to power – more than any concrete policy agenda is the unifying thread. Remember, Trump was a Democrat before he was a Republican. Ultimately, he’s driven not by ideology but by the search for maximum leverage he can use to crush opponents and score “wins.”
Are you concerned at all about the possibility of regime change in the US? On a daily basis, the Trump administration is doing stuff right out of a totalitarian playbook, and everybody seems to be folding their cards because they either don't understand the stakes or they hope it's somehow going to pass. As a scared European from a country with a totalitarian past, I personally doubt it will.
I’m less concerned than some because of the decentralized nature of America’s federal government (with many critical functions, including election administration, delegated to state and local authorities) as well as our professionalized, independent military. Trump’s authoritarian impulses also remain constrained by the president’s own lack of discipline and interest in the business of governance. This was the case during his first term and is still true now, as both Signalgate and Liberation Day made clear.
On the other hand, President Trump is far less constrained politically than last time, having consolidated control of the GOP, surrounded himself with yes men who encourage his most destructive whims, and asserted absolute power over the entire federal government. He’s also less constrained by markets/the private sector and the reelection imperative, and he faces a Democratic Party in absolute disarray.
The upshot is Trump won’t be as effective as many fear in undoing checks and balances, largely because his authoritarianism will continue to be tempered by his policymaking incompetence. But I admit that the risk of serious, structural damage to the US rule of law and democratic institutions is growing. I’m more concerned about this than I thought I’d be three months ago.
While globalization has been a boon for the US consumer, it has assisted in the relative decline of US manufacturing over the past 40 years. What policies would you recommend, if any, to (re)grow US manufacturing?
Not Trump’s present tariff policy, which will hurt rather than help US manufacturing. A majority of America’s goods imports are intermediate inputs, capital equipment, and raw materials that US manufacturers rely on to produce other goods, both for domestic consumption and for export. By making these imports more expensive, tariffs harm US producers and exporters (in addition to consumers via higher prices). Add to that the massive uncertainty about what tariff changes tomorrow may bring, and there are also no incentives for companies to build new factories in America.
Globalization is not principally responsible for the decline of US manufacturing over the past half-century. Productivity improvements and automation have reduced the need for manufacturing workers everywhere (even China is now seeing deindustrialization!). In fact, as a very rich country at the productivity frontier, America produces more value-added in manufacturing output today than ever before; it just takes fewer workers than it did after World War 2 to do that. That’s obviously sad for the individuals and communities that have lost jobs. In the aggregate, though, the decline in US manufacturing employment has been offset by an increase in higher-paying service-sector jobs (the average service worker gets paid more than the average manufacturing worker). If you wanted to increase manufacturing jobs, you’d have to either shift people out of those better-paying (often more comfortable) service jobs or grow the population (tough given the administration’s crackdown on immigration).
Now, there are strategic and national security reasons to protect and reshore select industries like semiconductors or batteries. But if you want to boost manufacturing in these core industries, the way to do it is through smart industrial policy: targeted subsidies, tax credits, state and local incentives, direct investments … like the Biden administration’s bipartisan CHIPS Act, which was followed by a manufacturing investment boom.
So maybe start by not undermining good programs for political reasons. Don't beat up on friends and adversaries simultaneously when what you need is to coordinate and trade more with allies. And focus on the broader ecosystem needed to foster investment and build a domestic manufacturing base. That means bolstering the scientific, research, and educational institutions that have made the US a magnet for world-class talent and innovation. Building better infrastructure to increase manufacturing productivity. And ensuring a stable, predictable business environment anchored in the rule of law.
Who blinks first, Xi or Trump? How could they de-escalate their trade tiff given their personal distaste for losing face?
Trump already has, with the unilateral exemption granted to electronic products like semiconductors and smartphones (even if it turns out to be temporary). The question is how many times he needs to blink before there's a climbdown. As they say, a wink is as good as a nod to a blind man, and at least since Covid, Xi has been convinced that China is facing a bipartisan strategy of containment from a hardline United States. Even with the latest exclusions, Trump’s tariffs are so high as to essentially amount to a trade embargo. Combine that with the concerted US efforts to crush Chinese tariff circumvention through third countries, and we’re already seeing the unmanaged decoupling of the most important geopolitical relationship in the world.
Given the deep structural mistrust between the two sides and Beijing’s political ability to “fight until the end,” I don’t see how you can put the toothpaste back in the tube. At most you can get a truce, and only as a result of a direct meeting between Xi and Trump. But Xi has little interest in negotiating directly with Trump at this stage, as it would be a sign of weakness and he doesn’t see the US president as a credible interlocutor.
In the current context, what is keeping China from invading Taiwan? What conditions are they waiting to have in place before "pulling the trigger," so to speak?
I see this scenario as extremely unlikely in the near term. Sure, Trump has basically broadcast that he doesn’t care about territorial integrity, and you could plausibly extend his treatment of Ukraine to Taiwan. But his cabinet is also full of China hawks, and if there’s one US ally every Republican in Washington wants to defend, it’s Taiwan against China. Beijing knows a full-scale invasion would risk direct war with the United States, which would be incredibly destructive to the Chinese economy at a time when they can hardly afford it.
Radical uncertainty about Trump’s response function makes Chinese leaders even more cautious than they normally would be. Beijing would rather wait to invade until the military balance more decisively favors China, its economy is on more solid footing, and the US is led by a more predictable president. But expect them to test US resolve and probe Trump’s response with incremental escalations across the board, none of which should be big enough to lead to a crisis on their own. The risk, however, is that as the US-China relationship breaks down, any accident or miscalculation could escalate into a military crisis given the lack of any conflict resolution channels.
Isn't it possible that Trump's creepy Russia obsession has to do with trying to get Russia as an ally against China?
In part, though there are plenty of other explanations (from his affinity for strongmen, transactional nature, and dislike for Vladimir Putin’s European and “woke” enemies, to his belief that the US shouldn’t waste resources on a war that isn’t core to American interests and Ukraine can’t win). At times, Trump seems more interested in cutting deals with both Putin and Xi Jinping to carve the world into spheres of influence.
But in any case, it’s unrealistic to think Trump could pull off a “reverse Nixon” given Russia and China’s shared interest in a post-American international order and deep commercial, energy, and technological ties. These are not the same countries that Henry Kissinger drove a wedge between 50 years ago (nor are they likely to change anytime soon). There’s nothing that the president of a democratic United States, even one as weakly constrained and authoritarian-minded as Trump, can credibly offer Putin that remotely competes with the kind of long-term strategic alignment he shares with Xi.
In fact, a Trump-brokered ceasefire in Ukraine and/or a US normalization of relations with Russia might actually strengthen Sino-Russian ties by allowing Beijing to fully embrace its “no limits” friendship with Moscow without risking US sanctions or jeopardizing its relations with Europe.
Given Trump's historically aggressive approach towards Iran and desire to distract from the tariff disaster, how high are your odds that the US and/or Israel will bomb Iran within the next 6 weeks?
Reasonably low since Trump doesn't want a war and is fully committed to trying engagement first, despite Israeli opposition. The difference in the American and Israeli positions is interesting: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently demanded a verifiable end to Iran’s entire nuclear program, whereas Trump seems to have lowered the bar to no weaponization. This is a condition that the Iranians, who have always maintained they have no intention to build a bomb, could potentially live with given their present historical weakness. The odds of an agreement are higher than they have been in a decade.
The Israelis might try to derail the negotiation effort diplomatically and even engage in some low-level provocations to spoil the Iranians’ mood, but they won't directly launch major strikes that could blow back in their face. Publicly sabotaging Trump would be far too risky.
What is the likelihood of the dollar losing its reserve currency status?
Dollar dominance is being eroded by Trump’s unpredictability and policy mix, which have caused a loss of confidence in the US government – and, accordingly, prompted investors to reprice the safety premium commanded by dollar assets.
But losing reserve currency status? That doesn't look imminent given the lack of viable alternatives. The yuan is not, in fact, convertible; China has to resort to draconian capital controls to prevent capital flight, and the country lacks the investor protections, institutional quality, and business environment required to internationalize its currency. The euro is the currency of a still-too-fragmented economic area mired in slow growth and high debt, with shallow capital markets and no banking, fiscal, or political union, where nativist parties could well gain power in the next five years and destabilize domestic politics. And cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are highly volatile, speculative assets with zero intrinsic or legislated value (unlike, say, the dollar, which is backed by America’s current and future wealth – and by the US government’s ability to tax it).
You can’t replace something with nothing, so the dollar’s special status is safe … for now. But Trump’s destruction of America’s reputational capital will cost the country dearly in the years to come. After all, every reserve currency that came before the dollar was dominant until it wasn’t. Investors have historically wanted to hold greenbacks because America’s economic, political, and institutional fundamentals inspired trust. Lose those fundamentals and you lose that trust.
Do you find that your Boston accent helps you come across as authentic?
It’s the first time I've ever considered that. I’d like to think it’s mostly down to being honest with people and not taking myself too seriously. But sure, why not? Can’t hurt.
What is Moose's favorite toy? And was it made in China?
Presently, a squeaky watermelon (it used to be a small bouncy orange ball, but he can't see as well as he used to so he's adapted). No idea where it was made.
The role NATO is playing in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic
What role, if any, does an intergovernmental military alliance like NATO have to play in the coronavirus pandemic? Quite a big one, says Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. "NATO's main task…is to prevent this health crisis from becoming a security crisis." How exactly does such a big organization like NATO accomplish that mission? That's a focus of his conversation with Ian Bremmer on GZERO World.
Watch the full episode: Will NATO adapt to emerging global threats?
NATO's past, present and future role in global politics
The world has changed dramatically since NATO was formed—and so have the biggest threats to peace and stability. No doubt Joe Biden's presidency will have major implications for the international alliance, but Ian Bremmer looks at how NATO got to where it is, and where it goes from here.
Watch the full episode: Will NATO adapt to emerging global threats?
Is NATO evolving fast enough to adapt to an ever-changing world?
How does NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg think his organization should adapt to a rapidly changing world? "The most important thing we can do is to make sure that we have strong international institutions. And that NATO remains a strong alliance, both militarily and politically." The fact that Stoltenberg stressed the importance of political evolution for a military alliance like NATO may indicate how much the modern battlefield has changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall. He spoke with Ian Bremmer on an episode of GZERO World.
Watch the full episode: Will NATO adapt to emerging global threats?